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Crossing the Rubicon: Closed hearings in the Supreme Court 
Bank Mellat v Her Majesty’s Treasury (No.1)1 deals with an eventuality which inevitably follows from 
the spread of closed material procedures (CMPs) since their introduction in the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission Act 1997: the use of CMP in the Supreme Court. Two questions fell to be 
decided: was it possible for the Supreme Court to adopt such a procedure? And, if so, was it 
appropriate for the court to adopt one in this particular case, regarding an application for the court 
to set aside an order under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008? The order in question had prohibited 
financial institutions from carrying out business with Bank Mellat, an Iranian institution accused of 
transferring funds for the development of nuclear weapons, effectively preventing it from doing 
business in the United Kingdom. That these questions fell to be decided in the shadow of the 
Supreme Court’s robust defence of the principle of open justice in Al Rawi v The Security Service,2 
where it was held the courts possessed no power at common law to order a CMP, makes the 
acquiescence of the majority on both counts troubling. Nevertheless, examination of the decision 
shows that its legacy for open justice is more mixed than this headline account might suggest. 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In the High Court, a CMP had been employed and Mitting J handed down two judgments – an open 
judgment dismissing the Bank’s application and a closed one to which he made two references in the 
open judgment, relating to points not at issue before the Supreme Court.3 In the Court of Appeal the 
High Court’s closed judgment was considered in a closed hearing, but in dismissing the appeal, no 
reference was made either to that hearing or to the closed judgment.4 On appeal to the Supreme 
Court, the first day was devoted to argument as to whether a CMP was possible in the Supreme 
Court. Having decided that it was, and that such a procedure should be adopted in the present case, 
the court later went into closed session. This judgment, giving the reasons for which the request was 
acceded to, both as a general proposition and in the particular circumstances of this case, was 
handed down alongside a second judgment in which the substantive appeal was allowed and the 
order against the bank quashed.5 
B. THE SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS 
The 2008 Act contains provisions requiring that the ‘rules of court’ have regard to the “need to 
secure” that “decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are properly reviewed” and to ensure 
that no disclosure of information takes place where it would be “contrary to the public interest.”6 
CMP must, in short, be made available. ‘Rules of court’ are defined as “rules for regulating the 
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6 s 66 (2) (a) and (b). 
practice and procedure to be followed in the High Court or the Court of Appeal or in the Court of 
Session.”7 As such, the Civil Procedure Rules were amended to include a rule permitting the use of 
CMP in proceedings under the 2008 Act. Proceedings in the Supreme Court, however, are governed 
by a separate set of rules, the Supreme Court Rules (SCR), which came into force only in 2009 and 
which make no reference to CMP. They provide only that all appeals are to be heard in open court 
except where “it is necessary in the interests of justice or in the public interest” for hearings to take 
place in private.8 Any party excluded must have a special advocate, appointed to represent his or her 
interests, present in the hearing.9 These facts leave a lacuna into which the majority (Lord 
Neuberger giving judgment, attracting the agreement of Lady Hale and Lords Clarke, Sumption and 
Carnwath) poured a bare consequentialist analysis, starting from the provision in the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005 (CRA) giving the court power to “determine any question necessary…. for the 
purposes of doing justice.”10 Lord Neuberger argued, by reductio ad absurdum, that none of the 
possible consequences of a decision that the Supreme Court had no power to employ a CMP were 
tenable and so, barring an over-riding argument to the contrary, pragmatism could justify the 
Supreme Court’s use of such a procedure.11 Each candidate for such an argument was dismissed. To 
the claim that the principle of legality required express words if a departure from natural justice was 
to be effected, it was replied that the ‘purpose and context’ of the provision was in fact to permit all 
decisions of the Court of Appeal to be appealed to the Supreme Court, in keeping with the plain 
meaning of the ‘any question’ provision.12 To the point that the 2008 Act made no mention of the 
Supreme Court Rules, it was pointed out that these had not yet been promulgated at the time of its 
enactment.13 Had there been a specific intention to exclude the Supreme Court from the possible 
reach of CMPs, Parliament would have said so explicitly, explaining what was to happen to otherwise 
untriable appeals.14 The claim that the Supreme Court is of such constitutional importance as to be 
incapable of employing a CMP was similarly rejected, though with palpable discomfort at the 
acknowledgment that employing a CMP would eventually mean going beyond what was done in the 
present case and issuing a closed judgment.15  
Six of the nine judges were thus willing to countenance the abstract possibility of adopting a CMP in 
the highest court, Lord Dyson being in agreement with Lord Neuberger’s decision on this point. 
Three dissented. Lord Hope stuck closely to the position staked out in Al-Rawi – the ‘fundamental’ 
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nature of the issue was to be insisted upon and meant that any departure could never rest upon 
mere implication, but would require specific statutory authority.16 In dissenting for this same reason, 
Lord Reed emphasised the status of the Supreme Court, questioning whether “secret justice at this 
level is appropriate,”17 and offering other workarounds, including one – the court examining the 
material without it being the subject of oral argument – which did not feature in Lord Neuberger’s 
consideration of the possible routes were CMP unavailable. Lord Kerr’s dissent on this point again 
makes the argument that, after Al-Rawi, departure from a fundamental right requires clear authority 
but adds that the implication of the Treasury’s argument is that the CRA did not authorise a CMP 
prior to the 2008 Act, but that this power was somehow activated by it.18  
C. A CLOSED HEARING IN THIS CASE? 
Notwithstandingthe robust defence of natural justice against attempts to have the courts employ 
CMPs without statutory authority in Al-Rawi, the majority here was willing to permit its employment 
here on tenuous such authority. The general question caused, however, less difficulty than the 
particular one, which was the source of seemingly significant anguish even for the five judges who 
accepted the use of CMP in Bank Mellat’s Supreme Court hearing. Lord Neuberger emphasises that 
the panel was ‘openly sceptical’ about the need to do so;19 that those in the majority had ‘real 
misgivings’ about it.20 And well they might have had: the majority and dissentients alike are clear 
that, with hindsight, there was no benefit to having seen the closed judgment – there was “nothing 
in it which could have affected [their] reasoning in relation to the substantive appeal, let alone which 
could have influenced the outcome of the appeal.”21 Having looked at the closed material, it was 
“abundantly clear that it was quite unnecessary to have done so.”22 So why was it?  
The Supreme Court employed a CMP for the first (but presumably not last) time, and against the 
advice of the Special Advocates, in order to consider a document of no value to the case at hand. It 
did so largely because counsel for the Treasury refused to answer questions as to why the Treasury 
desired the court to examine the closed judgment and so frustrated the court’s attempts to 
accurately determine the necessity of doing so. By refusing to provide context, the Treasury forced 
the court to err on the side of caution and take an action the judges seem to regret. Lord Hope is 
plain in his assessment of this tactic, which was “as unattractive as it was unconvincing,” but it was, 
of course, successful.23 Though he labels it a “misuse of the procedure,” this does not matter. 24 
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What matters is that the procedure was used at all. One is left with the strong impression that the 
Supreme Court was, if not quite tricked, then certainly denied, deliberately and cynically, sufficient 
context as to permit it to be confident that nothing in the closed judgment would influence its 
decision, and so no injustice done by deciding the appeal without seeing it. Unattractive though the 
Treasury’s conduct may have been, it bore fruit. The executive can now point to a clear decision of 
the Supreme Court establishing the permissibility of a CMP in that court, rather than a series of 
persuasive but nevertheless obiter remarks on the topic, which is all that this case would have 
provided had the court decided that there was no need to use a CMP and so no need to decide the 
abstract question of whether one might be permitted at all. The Rubicon has been crossed, and for 
no good reason.25  
D. BANK MELLAT’S LEGACY FOR OPEN JUSTICE 
This precedent does not exhaust the significance of Bank Mellat (No.1), and fortunately the case’s 
other legacy is a more auspicious one. Indeed, what significance it might have beyond the obvious 
derives from Lord Neuberger’s attempt to mitigate the effect of the court’s decision here. Having 
been ‘fooled’ once, he seems to seek to ensure that such a significant departure from open justice 
would not happen again so unnecessarily, providing guidance as to how and when CMPs should be 
used – in general, and not merely in proceedings under the 2008 Act.26 Had the guidance – which, 
inter alia, instructs appellate courts to be “robust about acceding to applications to go into closed 
session” – been followed in the present case, there would have been no CMP in the Supreme 
Court.27 Its status in general is intriguing. The many situations in which CMPs are used can be divided 
into those engaging the subject’s right to liberty, in which a ‘gist’ of the allegations must be provided 
so as to permit the individual to give effective instruction to counsel, and those in which, the right to 
liberty not being engaged, there is no such requirement. 28 The Bank Mellat guidance would seem, 
however, to lay down requirements regarding closed judgments which equal, and might in some 
cases surpass, that ‘gist’ minimum, even in circumstance in which the ECHR has not hitherto 
required a ‘gist’. Though couched in context-sensitive language, addressed to what is possible in the 
specific circumstances of a case in which CMP is sought or used, it may transpire that Lord 
Neuberger’s judgment eventually renders Bank Mellat a more important decision for the promotion 
of open justice than was Al-Rawi itself, given that it applies even where Parliament has provided 
explicit statutory authority for the use of CMP.  
The guidance in this sense works against the strong initial impression of Bank Mellat (No. 1) as an 
exercise in futility: the relatively minor futility of considering the closed judgment and the far more 
consequential futility of establishing, in order to permit such consideration, a precedent which 
dilutes the stand taken in Al-Rawi. This does not mean, however, that the decision will need to 
shoulder the blame for all future use of the CMP in the Supreme Court: it resolves the question of 
such use on the authority of the CRA, but elsewhere explicit provision is made. The Justice and 
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Security Act 2013, which received the Royal Assent in the period between argument and decision in 
Bank Mellat, includes the Supreme Court amongst those in which ‘relevant civil proceedings’ might 
take place and for which the relevant rules of court are therefore required to provide for the 
opportunity to secure a CMP.29 Even the decision in Bank Mellat had gone the other way, therefore, 
it would have represented a more lasting victory for the principle of legality than for the principle of 
open justice, upon which legislative developments continue to trample. Parliament would have had 
to pay the political price for the continued expansion of infringements of open justice but that price, 
it seems, is not a high one. From the Scottish perspective, the question is settled. The 2013 Act, like 
the 2008 Act before it, applies unambiguously to proceedings in the Court of Session and the Rules 
of the Court of Session have been amended in order permit the use of CMP in proceedings under the 
2008 Act.30 
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